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(UN)COMMON  LAW  PROTECTION  OF
CERTIFICATION  MARKS
Michelle B. Smit*
INTRODUCTION
A quick Google search of “trademark” and “common law” yields a handy
booklet published by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) regarding everything one needs to know when considering the
ideal protection for their trademark.1  One of the sections in the booklet
addresses the question, “Is federal registration of my mark required?”2  The
answer?  No.3  It is well-established that trademarks also exist at common law.
However, no such handy booklet exists for certification marks.  Although
both certification marks and trademarks are protected under the United
States Trademark Act (“Lanham Act”), certification marks are fundamentally
different.  Certification marks indicate collective origin, rather than unique
commercial origin, and have specific registration requirements that are inap-
plicable to trademarks.4
So far, there has been no sufficient “yes” or “no” answer to the question
of whether certification marks, like trademarks, exist at common law.  What
little scholarship there is on the matter posits that certification marks can
develop under common law, but this view is based entirely on a single federal
district court opinion and a single Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB) decision.5  However, this overgeneralizes the caselaw because, of the
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018; Bachelor of Arts in
Chinese Studies and Bachelor of Business Administration in Marketing, Grand Valley State
University, 2015.  Thanks to Professor Mark McKenna for his helpful suggestions
throughout the writing process.  Thanks also to my colleagues of the Notre Dame Law Review
for their revisions.  All errors are my own.
1 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PROTECTING YOUR
TRADEMARK: ENHANCING YOUR RIGHTS THROUGH FEDERAL REGISTRATION (2016), https://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/trademarks/basics/BasicFacts.pdf.
2 Id. at 10.
3 Id.
4 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1306.01(b)–(c) (96th rev. ed.
2017).
5 Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About Geographical
Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 310 (2006) (first citing Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F.
Supp. 428, 430 (M.D. Fla. 1971); then citing Institut Nat’l des Appellations d’Origine v.
Brown-Forman Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1875, 1885 (T.T.A.B. 1998)).
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three types of certification marks, those cases only refer to one specific type.6
The utility of certification marks would be compromised under a common-
law regime, because it would create opportunity for anticompetitive abuses
that only a registration-based system could adequately address.  While the
current federal registration system for certification marks has its own flaws, it
can be revised in order to address the specific needs of certification mark
enforcement.
Part I of this Note defines and examines the general principles of certifi-
cation marks.  From that foundation, Part II provides an overview of the case
law on unregistered common law certification marks.  Part III analyzes the
reasons why abuses of certification marks would increase under a common-
law regime and posits that certification marks, therefore, should only exist
under federal law.  Finally, Part IV proposes several adjustments that should
be made to the current certification mark registration system in order to
address existing shortcomings that affect both consumers and third-party
businesses.
I. BACKGROUND OF CERTIFICATION MARKS
A. Certification Marks
Most consumers are familiar with trademarks and can easily rattle off
examples without much thought—NIKE for sports equipment, APPLE for
computer products, and LEVI’S for jeans.  However, consumers would likely
be hard-pressed to conjure an example of a certification mark, let alone to
describe the purpose of one.7  “A certification mark is a special creature cre-
ated for a purpose uniquely different from that of an ordinary service mark
or trademark . . . .”8  Rather than indicating a unique commercial source,
like trademarks, certification marks inform consumers that the goods or ser-
vices they are purchasing “possess certain characteristics or meet certain qual-
ifications or standards.”9  The utility of certification marks is not only to
prevent public confusion like trademarks, but also to promote healthy com-
petition within the marketplace of a certified product.10  Some examples of
certification marks include Underwriters Laboratories Inc.’s “UL” symbol,
used for electrical equipment that meets its safety standards, the Florida
Department of Citrus’s “Fresh From Florida” seal,11 which is used for citrus
6 Real Juices, Inc., 330 F. Supp. at 429; Brown-Forman Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1883 (referencing geographic marks).
7 Michael B. Chesal, Deciphering Certification Marks, 47 BROWARD DAILY BUS. A7 (2006)
(referring to certification marks as the “lesser-known stepchild of the trademark family”).
8 In re Fla. Citrus Comm’n, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 495, 499 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
9 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GEOGRAPHICAL INDICA-
TION PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 3, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
web/offices/dcom/olia/globalip/pdf/gi_system.pdf.
10 Idaho Potato Comm’n v. G & T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 425 F.3d 708, 715 (9th
Cir. 2005) (citing Idaho Potato Comm’n v. M & M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130,
138 (2d Cir. 2003)).
11 Chesal, supra note 7.
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products grown in Florida that meet certain quality standards, and the
“Woolmark” logo on certain knit goods meeting specified percentages of new
wool.12
Although certification marks may go unnoticed by many consumers, for
some consumers of certain products, the presence or absence of a certifica-
tion mark could determine whether they purchase the product at all.13
A certification mark is defined as:
[A]ny word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—(1) used
by a person other than its owner, or (2) which its owner has a bona fide
intention to permit a person other than the owner to use in commerce and
files an application to register on the principal register established by this
chapter, to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture,
quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s goods or services
or that the work or labor on the goods or services was performed by mem-
bers of a union or other organization.14
Three different kinds of certification marks exist and are distinguished
by what they indicate.15  A certification mark may indicate the following: “1)
regional or other origin; 2) material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy
or other characteristics of the goods/services; or 3) that the work or labor on
the goods/services was performed by a member of a union or other
organization.”16
1. Registration of Certification Marks
Like trademarks, all three types of certification marks may be registered
under the Lanham Act.17  An application to register a certification mark
must include “[a] statement specifying what the applicant is certifying about
12 Woolmark Certification, WOOLMARK, http://www.woolmark.com/certification/ (last
visited Oct. 18, 2017).
13 Chesal, supra note 7.  For example, many health-conscious and religious consumers,
such as Jews, Muslims, and Seventh Day Adventists, look for the presence of a reliable
Kosher certification mark on food products—such as the OU symbol of the Union of
Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America—before purchasing the product. Id.; see also
Wynn Heh, Comment, Who Certifies the Certifiers?, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 688, 690 (2015) (not-
ing that certification marks play an important role in sustainability efforts, because they
can guide consumers in purchasing “green goods”).
14 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
15 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 2.
16 Id.
17 15 U.S.C. § 1054.
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the goods or services in the application,”18 and “[a] copy of the certification
standards governing use of the certification mark on or in connection with
the goods or services specified in the application.”19  A mark owner must
license all who meet those standards to use the certification mark in connec-
tion with their goods or services, thus “mak[ing] certification ‘a form of lim-
ited compulsory licensing.’”20
Several additional statutory standards are unique to certification marks.
First, unlike a trademark which is used to indicate the source of the mark
owner’s product, the registrant of a certification mark may not produce the
goods or provide the services that the certification mark certifies—the mark
owner can never place the certification mark on any of its own goods or ser-
vices.21  However, the owner of a certification mark is permitted to use its
mark in “advertising or promoting recognition of the certification program
or of the goods or services meeting the certification standards of the regis-
trant” as long as the “registrant does not itself produce, manufacture, or sell
any of the certified goods or services to which its identical certification mark
is applied.”22  The reason for this requirement is “because of the fear that a
certifier competing in the marketplace with the goods or services it is certify-
ing would no longer be able to certify objectively based on the certification
standard.”23  This type of abusive certification mark behavior would have
anticompetitive effects in the marketplace and usurp the main objective of
certification marks.24
2. Control of Certification Marks
The owner of a certification mark must also control the use of its
mark.25  The statute implicitly recognizes two ways lack of control could
result in cancellation of the certification mark registration.26  The first is a
mark owner’s failure to control the use of the mark.27  Specifically, if a mark
owner fails to verify that products or services meet the certification mark stan-
dards before granting permission to use the certification mark, it may result
18 37 C.F.R. § 2.45(a)(4)(i)(A) (2012).
19 Id. § 2.45(a)(4)(i)(B).
20 Idaho Potato Comm’n v. G & T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 425 F.3d 708, 716 (9th
Cir. 2005) (quoting 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION, § 19:92 (4th ed. 2016)).
21 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(B), (C).
22 Id. § 1064.
23 Jeanne C. Fromer, The Unregulated Certification Mark(et), 69 STAN. L. REV. 121, 130
(2017).
24 Id.; see also In re Fla. Citrus Comm’n, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 495, 499 (T.T.A.B. 1968)
(noting that to allow the registrant to use a certification mark on its own goods “will only
lead to the dilution and impairment of the purpose and function of a certification mark as
well as to practices wholly inconsistent with the public desirability of safeguarding the con-
suming public from confusion and damage not of its own making”).
25 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(A).
26 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 19:92.
27 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(A).
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in a court finding that the mark owner had a lack of control.28  For example,
in Midwest Plastic Fabricators, Inc. v. Underwriters Laboratories Inc.,29 control was
especially important because of the increased risk that consumers would be
misled by a certification mark representing specific qualities of the goods
that bear the mark.30  Complete control is not required—the mark owner
must only demonstrate “considerable diligence in controlling the use of its
marks.”31  The relevant question is whether control is in fact maintained—
not whether the mark owner had a formal quality control system.32  Addition-
ally, the Federal Circuit held that the registrant is not required to personally
test products and services to “declare to the public that items carrying the
mark meet the standards.”33
The second way a court may find a lack of control is if the certification
mark becomes generic.34  Section 1064(5)(A) implicitly contemplates that if
the mark owner “fail[s] to control use of the mark by those other than
licensed users,” the mark may no longer certify those goods or services.35
That result has been likened to the mark becoming generic.36  Traditional
genericide—where the registered certification mark becomes the generic
name for the goods or services it certifies—is also grounds for the registra-
tion to be cancelled.37
The registrant’s use of the mark is strictly limited for purposes to cer-
tify.38  Additionally, a registrant may not “discriminately refuse[ ] to certify or
to continue to certify the goods or services of any person who maintains the
standards or conditions which such mark certifies.”39  Failure to adhere to
these standards will render the certification mark subject to cancellation.40
The requirement to license all conforming goods or services coupled with
the prohibition of placing the certification mark on the registrant’s own
28 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 19:92.
29 906 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
30 Id. at 1572.
31 Midwest Plastic Fabricators, Inc. v. Underwriters Labs. Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1267, 1273, 1275 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (where mark owner had a “vast network of inspectors
making hundreds of thousands of inspections of thousands of different products across the
country”), aff’d, 906 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
32 Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1888 (T.T.A.B.
2006) (citing Halo Mgmt., LLC v. Interland, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2003)).
33 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 19:92.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Swiss Watch Int’l, Inc. v. Fed’n of Swiss Watch Indus., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1731,
1739 (T.T.A.B. 2012) (noting this type of lack of control “is akin to the mark becoming
generic”).
37 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012); Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 303
F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1962) (noting that if the meaning of a geographical name which is
registered as a certification mark on certain goods becomes the principal significance of
those goods, the mark is subject to cancellation).
38 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(C).
39 Id. § 1064(5)(D).
40 Id. § 1064.
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goods “removes incentives for mark holders to engage in anti-competitive
conduct” and appears to be “designed to promote free competition in the
market for certified products.”41
Although consumer trust is one of the driving factors behind control of
certification marks,42 the reliability of the certification mark is largely left up
to the mark owner.  The mark owner creates the standards, the mark owner
decides what products will bear the mark, and the mark owner convinces
consumers that the certification mark reliably ensures the quality standards it
represents.43  Unless the mark owner independently decides to publish infor-
mation regarding its efforts in preventing unauthorized use of the certifica-
tion mark, the consumer would probably not be able to get access to that
information in order to determine the reliability of a particular mark.44
Where the mark owner chooses not to publish information about the certifi-
cation standards, the only check on the certification mark would be the mar-
ketplace itself.
B. Indications of Regional Origin—One Type of Certification Mark
The Lanham Act essentially codified existing common law for trade-
marks.45  Although the Lanham Act also provides protection for certification
marks, there was no preexisting common law for certification marks.46  The
enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946 is regarded as the first time the United
States “deliberately and unambiguously embraced . . . certification marks.”47
Prior to the Lanham Act, the closest thing akin to recognizing collective ori-
gin in the United States was characterized under an unfair competition
claim.  For example, in Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture
Co.,48 twenty-five plaintiffs, furniture manufacturers from Grand Rapids,
Michigan, sued defendants from Chicago, Illinois, who were furniture manu-
facturers operating under the same name.49  The court granted plaintiffs an
injunction after finding that defendants’ use of “Grand Rapids” resulted in
unfair competition, because “‘Grand Rapids furniture’ [had] acquired in the
trade a special significance; and furniture made in [Grand Rapids was] held
41 Idaho Potato Comm’n v. G & T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 425 F.3d 708, 717 (9th
Cir. 2005).
42 Chesal, supra note 7.
43 Id. (noting a common misconception about “certification marks is that there is
some kind of government control over the standards set by the [mark owner]”).
44 Id.
45 Overview of Trademark Law, HARV. UNIV., https://cyber.harvard.edu/metaschool/
fisher/domain/tm.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2017).
46 Sandra Edelman, How to Infringe a Certification Mark—The Second Circuit Counts the
Ways, TMCA (June 16, 2016), http://thetmca.com/how-to-infringe-a-certification-mark-
the-second-circuit-counts-the-ways/.
47 Paul Duguid, A Case of Prejudice? The Uncertain Development of Collective and
Certification Marks 2 (Aug. 28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://people.ischool
.berkeley.edu/~duguid/articles/CofP-2.pdf.
48 127 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942).
49 Id. at 246.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL110.txt unknown Seq: 7  9-NOV-17 14:04
2017] (un)common  law  protection 425
by a large part of the purchasing public to be superior in design, workman-
ship and value.”50  The Grand Rapids case was decided in 1942, four years
before the Lanham Act was enacted.  Despite never using the term “certifica-
tion mark,” this case’s significance is its foreshadowing of the idea of protect-
ing collective origin.
The Lanham Act created federal protection for certification marks in
the United States and specifically excepted certification marks indicating
regional origin from the prohibition against registration of names that are
primarily geographically descriptive.51  Although federal protection of marks
indicating collective origin was new to the United States, Europe had been
protecting a form of collective origin mark known as geographical indica-
tions (“GIs”) for centuries.52  The term “geographical indication” is generally
used to refer to the legal concept at the international level.53  The compara-
ble protected mark in the United States is the indication of regional origin
under the certification mark protection.  Certification marks increased in
importance in the United States after the United States joined several other
nations in signing the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement54 (“TRIPS”) in 1994, which provided minimal standards of pro-
tection for GIs internationally.55
TRIPS merely requires a minimum-level protection floor for GIs,56 and
“TRIPS is silent as to the mechanism of protection and it is understood that
each country may fulfill these obligations through its own particular domestic
law tools.”57  Two distinct methods of protecting GIs have evolved.58  The
first method originated in France and involves a centralized system of protec-
tion that is widely used in many European countries.59  The second method
is one used in the United States and protects indications of regional origin
through existing trademark law—particularly via certification and collection
trademarks.60
Historically, geographic terms were not eligible for trademark protec-
tion in the United States.  Trademarks indicate unique commercial source
50 Id.
51 Referring to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (2012).
52 Hughes, supra note 5, at 306 (noting that some laws controlling wine labels and use
of geographic origin existed in Europe as early as the fourteenth century).
53 Justin Hughes et al., That’s a Fine Chablis You’re Not Drinking: The Proper Place for
Geographical Indications in Trademark Law, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 933,
934 (2007).
54 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
55 Hughes, supra note 5, at 301 (“[I]t was not until the Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement that geographical indication protection joined
the ranks of copyright, patents, and trademarks.” (footnote omitted)).
56 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9.
57 Hughes, supra note 5, at 314 (emphasis added).
58 Id. at 305.
59 See id. at 306–08.
60 Id. at 311–14.
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whereas geographic terms would, at most, indicate collective origin.  Under
the Lanham Act, geographic terms or signs are not registerable as valid trade-
marks if they are geographically descriptive or geographically misdescriptive
of where the goods originate.61  The theory behind not registering these
kinds of terms is that other competitors in the geographic area might need to
use that term to describe where their product came from, and a single per-
son should not be entitled to exclusive use of the term.62  Additionally,
unlike trademarks, geographic terms do not indicate unique commercial ori-
gin—they indicate collective origin.  Because geographic terms cannot indi-
cate unique commercial origin, they are incapable of acquiring secondary
meaning, because secondary meaning occurs when a mark “has become dis-
tinctive as applied to [a single] applicant’s goods or services in commerce.”63
Therefore, under basic trademark law, a geographic term could never be
protectable.  The Lanham Act contemplates the impossibility of indications
of regional origin qualifying for protection under trademark law, so it specifi-
cally excepts indications of regional origin from the prohibition against regis-
tration of names that are primarily geographically descriptive.64
II. CURRENT CASELAW ON COMMON-LAW CERTIFICATION MARKS
The common-law argument for certification marks derives from Section
1054 of the Lanham Act:
 Subject to the provisions relating to the registration of trademarks, so far
as they are applicable, collective and certification marks, including indica-
tions of regional origin, shall be registrable under this chapter, in the same
manner and with the same effect as are trademarks . . . and when registered
they shall be entitled to the protection provided in this chapter in the case of
trademarks, except in the case of certification marks when used so as to
represent falsely that the owner or a user thereof makes or sells the goods or
performs the services on or in connection with which such mark is used.65
The majority of legal scholarship on certification marks asserts that unre-
gistered certification marks, like unregistered trademarks, can be protected
at common law.66  For example, Justin Hughes asserts that “[l]ike other
trademarks, certification marks can develop as a matter of common law with-
61 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
62 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GEOGRAPHICAL INDICA-
TIONS FAQS, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/geographical-indi-
cations/geographical-indications-faqs#488 (last modified Aug. 5, 2016).
63 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK MANUAL
OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1212 (Apr. 2017 ed.) [hereinafter TMEP].
64 See Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 303 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir.
1962); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 62 (referring to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)
(noting the built-in exception for GIs falling under 15 U.S.C. § 1054)).
65 15 U.S.C § 1054.
66 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 19:90 (noting that even “[t]he Restatement takes the
position that certification marks do exist at common law”).
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out USPTO registration.”67  Scholars often cite Florida v. Real Juices, Inc.68
and Institut National Des Appellations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp.69 as the
seminal cases in support of this assertion.70
However, current legal scholarship fails to address the distinction that
the caselaw only addresses one specific category of certification marks—indi-
cations of regional origin.  This Part of the Note will provide an overview of
the two seminal cases regarding common law rights of certification marks,
and Part III will analyze the reasons such common-law precedent should not
be extended to certification marks, or at the very least, should not be
extended beyond indications of regional origin.
In Florida v. Real Juices, Inc.,71 the State of Florida’s Department of Citrus
(DOC) sued a corporation called Real Juices, Inc., for using the name “Sun-
shine Tree” on orange juice products.72  DOC claimed “Sunshine Tree” vio-
lated its common-law certification mark used on citrus products originating
in Florida.73  DOC had not registered its certification mark, but it claimed it
had developed common-law rights in “Sunshine Tree” through television,
radio, and newspaper advertising.74  The issue before the court was “whether
federal trademark law protects an unregistered common law certification
mark.”75  The court held that there was “no determinative substantive distinc-
tion between certification marks and trademarks” and that “rights in an unre-
gistered certification mark can be acquired in the same manner as they can
in trademarks.”76
Nearly three decades later, the TTAB reviewed an opposition against an
intent-to-use application for the mark “CANADIAN MIST AND COGNAC”
for “an alcoholic beverage consisting primarily of a mixture of Canadian
whiskey and cognac.”77  The Bureau National Interprofessionel du Cognac
(BNIC) challenged the application on the grounds that “Cognac” was a well-
known geographical mark, and its use was thus restricted by French law to
distilled spirits that met a certain quality standard and were produced in the
Cognac region of France.78  BNIC further asserted that the term “Cognac”
was a common-law certification mark under 15 U.S.C. § 1127,79 because “pur-
chasers primarily understand the designation COGNAC to refer to brandy
67 Hughes, supra note 5, at 310; Deborah J. Kemp & Lynn M. Forsythe, Trademarks and
Geographical Indications: A Case of California Champagne, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 257, 290 (2006).
68 330 F. Supp. 428 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
69 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1875 (T.T.A.B. 1998).
70 Hughes, supra note 5, at 310 n.61.
71 330 F. Supp. 428.
72 Id. at 429.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 429–30.
75 Id. at 430.
76 Id.
77 Institut Nat’l Des Appellations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1875, 1877 (T.T.A.B. 1998).
78 Id.
79 Id.
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originating in the Cognac region of France, and not to brandy produced
elsewhere.”80  The TTAB held that “Cognac” was indeed a “common law
regional certification mark.”81  It distinguished that the issue was not
whether consumers were aware of the certification function of the mark;
rather, the issue was whether the consumers understood the mark meant the
goods only came from the region named in the mark.82
III. CERTIFICATION MARKS SHOULD NOT EXIST AT COMMON LAW
A. Current Landscape
Those two cases form the primary precedent cited for the argument that
certification marks enjoy common-law protection.  However, the caselaw only
addresses one specific kind of certification marks—indications of regional
origin.  Therefore, no authority has held that the other two types of certifica-
tion marks have any protection outside federal registration.83  Section III.B
addresses current shortcomings of certification mark protection that would
be exasperated if certification marks were allowed common-law protection,
and Part IV proposes some changes to the existing registration system in
order to curb some of the abuses.  The shortcomings and proposed solution
are relevant to all three types of certification marks; however, because of the
existing caselaw regarding common-law protection of indications of regional
origin, the focus of this Note will be on the other two types of certification
marks: (1) marks indicating “material, mode of manufacture, quality, accu-
racy or other characteristics of the goods/services;” and (2) marks indicating
“that the work or labor on the goods/services was performed by a member of
a union or other organization.”84  Increasing registration requirements for
two types of certification marks is the second-best solution to addressing all
three, at least until more authority confirms whether indications of regional
origin will continue to have common-law protection.85
80 Id. at 1885.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 However, given the language of Section 1054, it is not unreasonable to argue that
courts have, in effect, swept all three types of certification marks included in the definition
of Section 1127 under the common law protection established by courts for certification
marks of regional origin.  An argument for extending common law protection to all types
of certification marks can also be found in the statutory language itself: “[C]ertification
marks, including indications of regional origin, shall be registerable under this chapter, in
the same manner and with the same effect as are trademarks” and “[t]he term ‘mark’ includes any
trademark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark.”  15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2012)
(emphasis added); Id. § 1127.
84 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 2.
85 There is a statutory argument that the courts that held indications of regional origin
have common law protection erred in judgment.  Section 1054, even after the 1988 revi-
sions, provides that certification marks “[s]ubject to the provisions relating to the registra-
tion of trademarks, so far as they are applicable . . . shall be registrable under [the Lanham
Act].”  15 U.S.C. § 1054 (emphasis added).  Section 1054 concludes with, “[a]pplications
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Certification marks differ fundamentally from trademarks in ways that
render certification marks ill-suited for common-law protection.  Unlike
trademarks, certification marks indicate the presence or absence of specific
quality standards, the mark owner is not the one using the mark, but rather,
must allow anyone else who meets the specified standards to use the mark,
and, therefore, indicate collective rather than unique commercial origin.
Given these differences, certification marks ought to only have protection if
they are federally registered and comply with the additional proposed
requirements detailed in Part IV of this Note.
B. Certification Marks Are Ill-Suited for Common-Law Protection
The common-law system is ill-suited for certification marks and would
exasperate existing flaws in certification mark protection and undermine the
goals of certification marks.  Current shortcomings of certification mark pro-
tection—abuse of certification standards, weak or nonexistent enforcement
of those standards, and inaccessibility of information that results in anticom-
petitive consequences—would all worsen under a common-law certification
mark regime, but can be strengthened under a purely registration-based
system.
1. Standard Abuse
Essentially, no structured policing or regulation of certification stan-
dards exist, which results in abusive standard revision and anticompetitive
behavior by certification mark owners that would worsen under a common-
law regime.  Although registrants are required to provide the USPTO with
information about the certifying standard, a degree of detail is not man-
dated.86  When applying for registration for a certification mark, the regis-
trant need only provide a copy of the standards they created, and the law
requires no level of specificity.87  This has resulted in fluid and vague certifi-
cation mark standards and anticompetitive abuses where the mark owner is
able to purposefully revise its standards to exclude certain businesses.88
Certification mark owners have preserved flexible certification mark
registration standards by not publishing concrete or comprehensive informa-
tion about their certification standards.  This allows them to remain free to
change their standards—sometimes the change is necessary to adapt to what
consumers expect the certification mark to mean and to address changes in
terms of what quality is expected in the marketplace.  The freedom to change
and procedure under this section shall conform as nearly as practicable to those prescribed
for the registration of trademarks.” Id. (emphasis added).  This language indicates an
intent to create protection for certification marks distinct from trademarks.
86 Fromer, supra note 23, at 160 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2.45(a) (2012)).
87 37 C.F.R. § 2.45(a)(4)(1)(B) (only requiring applicant to submit “[a] copy of the
certification standards”).
88 Fromer, supra note 23, at 158.
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standards, however, also results in anticompetitive abuses.89  Certifiers must
be permitted to maintain some level of flexibility in order to adapt to con-
sumers’ expectations, because the success of a certifier depends largely on
how much the consumers of the goods and businesses that provide the goods
trust the certifier and the standards that are represented by the certification
mark.90  If the expectations deviate too far from the reality of the certifica-
tion standards, trust will be diminished.91
However, too much flexibility in certification standards harms healthy
competition in the marketplace, which is an objective of certification
marks.92  Certification mark standards are not intended to be private to a
business—they are meant “to be specified and publicly available.”93  Without
sufficient regulation, too much flexibility in the standards can lead to the
unfair use of certification marks to favor certain businesses over others,
instead of its intended purpose of truthfully and accurately representing the
absence or presence of certain quality standards to consumers and competi-
tors.94  This is an anticompetitive behavior because it involves businesses
being denied the certification—not because of insufficient standards of qual-
ity—but because of the certifier’s ulterior motives.95  The excluded business
is hurt competitively to the extent the businesses that were granted the certi-
fication mark benefit from the designation.96
This compromises the competitive purpose of mark certification, which
is to indicate “a standard’s presence or absence for particular goods and ser-
vices—nothing more and nothing less.”97  Therefore, when a certifier
manipulates the flexibility of certification standards in order to provide or
withhold the mark from businesses for reasons other than the presence or
absence of the specified standard, it is improper (ab)use of the certification
mark system.  These abuses occur even under the existing federal registration
system for certification marks, so these abuses would only worsen under a
common-law regime where enforcement would occur retroactively via the
court system.  Without regulations threatening cancellation of the mark for
proper application of standards or an administrative entity policing the certi-
fication standards, mark owners under a common-law regime would have lit-
tle incentive to strictly define or apply their certification mark standards.
The only threat would be a lawsuit, but even if a competitor did eventually
file a suit for standard abuse (assuming it noticed the abuse in the first
place), it is only a retroactive solution at best.  The anticompetitive harm
would have already been inflicted on competitors and consumers.  Loose
89 See id. at 160, 163–64.
90 See id. at 161–62.
91 Id. at 164.
92 See id. at 163–64.
93 Id. at 163.
94 See id. at 164.
95 See id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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standards are a threat to intellectual property law, because “IP rights are fun-
damentally exclusionary and need clear justifications [and standards]
because they affect ‘what [people] may do, how they may speak, and how
they may earn a living.’”98  The current shortcomings of the registration sys-
tem will be addressed by proposed solutions in Part IV, but it is clear that
standard abuses would only increase under common-law protection.
2. Enforcement Problem
Separate from the problem of standard abuse due to the flexibility per-
mitted by the Lanham Act (and even more so if common law were to apply)
is the initial problem of how to enforce the standards the mark owner estab-
lishes.  Despite requiring submission of certification standards upon applying
for registration, the government does not control the standards the mark
owner uses.99  Section 1064 requires that a certifier maintain control over its
certification mark or its registration may be cancelled; however, it fails to
define what level of “control” is required.100  Nevertheless, complete control
“would be impracticable, if not impossible,” so the relevant question is what
level of control is adequate.101
Under a common-law regime, there would be even less control and
enforcement over certification standards, particularly because of certain
inherent financial incentives.102  Because certification mark owners are pro-
hibited from using the mark on their own goods,103 the financial drive
behind establishing and maintaining a certification mark lies in fees earned
per issued certification.104  The monetary and reputational success associated
with issuing certifications would likely prevail over many certifiers’ desires to
enforce standards reliably, thus resulting in certification marks on products
that fall short of the quality standards.  Understandably, “consumers are
often skeptical about the legitimacy of [certification mark] programs where
the business interests of the [certifiers] may conflict with consumer inter-
ests.”105  Common law protection would be a breeding ground for consumer
distrust regarding the legitimacy of certification mark programs given the
financial and reputational incentives left unchecked.
Over time, the marketplace may serve to address this issue of control.  If
a certifier fails to control its certification mark, in theory, the certification
98 DEV GANGJEE, RELOCATING THE LAW OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 8 (William R.
Cornish et al. eds., 2012) (second alteration in original) (quoting Jeremy Waldron, From
Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 841, 887 (1993)).
99 See Fromer, supra note 23, at 126 (citing 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 19.91)
100 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (2012).
101 Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1888 (T.T.A.B.
2006).
102 See Fromer, supra note 23, at 155.
103 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5).
104 See Fromer, supra note 23, at 155.
105 Heh, supra note 13, at 705.
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mark would lose meaning in the eyes of competitors and consumers.  In los-
ing meaning, the certification mark would also become less valuable (or val-
ueless).  However, this self-policing theory fails under several scenarios.  First,
slight revisions to certification standards or the occasional failure to enforce
them may not be enough for consumers and competitors to notice.  But the
slight revisions would nevertheless allow the mark owner to improperly allow
some to use the mark and prevent others from using the mark.  Second, con-
sumers and competitors may catch on to the certifier’s lack of control, but by
the time they notice, the anticompetitive damage may have already been
inflicted.  This is particularly problematic when certification standards are
complex or not easily observed.  The self-policing marketplace theory is,
therefore, not the ideal solution to address existing certification mark abuses.
The current system for registration of a certification mark struggles with
this enforcement problem as well.  After a business is granted its certification
mark registration, “neither the USPTO nor any other public agency regularly
oversees . . . the standards supposedly represented by a [certification
mark].”106  The most analogous example of oversight existing for certifica-
tion marks is that the Lanham Act permits a petition of cancellation to be
filed by “any person who believes that he is or will be damaged” by the mark
owner’s lack of control over the standards107 and that “any person” includes
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).108  While it has been noted that one
objective of certification marks is to protect consumers, it is not clear
whether consumers (as opposed to business competitors) are permitted to
file a petition to cancel registration of a certification mark.109  Even if they
were, it is unlikely that an individual consumer, realizing the certified good
they purchased falls short of the certification standards, would have the
resources to enact a legal suit against a more sophisticated mark owner.
3. Anticompetitive Consequences of Inaccessibility of Information
Both consumers110 and competitors are the relevant public who need to
have access to the certification standards, and, under a common-law regime,
106 Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2311, 2335 (2009).
107 15 U.S.C. § 1064.
108 Id. (“[T]he Federal Trade Commission may apply to cancel on the grounds speci-
fied in paragraphs (3) and (5) of this section.”).
109 See Chon, supra note 106, at 2335–36 (citing Halicki v. United Artists Commc’ns,
Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987)).
110 Besides competitors, consumers are the other relevant group that has a stake in
publishing certification mark standards. See David J. Kera & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., United
States Annual Review: The Fifty-Seventh Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of
1946, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 5, 15, 20 (2005).  Additional proof that consumers are a relevant
audience of certification marks is that consumers are considered when determining
whether a certification mark has fallen subject to genericide. Id. at 28 (citing Magic Wand,
Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).  An alternative view is that certification
marks are analogous to trademarks, and for trademarks, consumers do not need to know
the specifics of the product’s quality, just that the product’s quality is consistent. William. R.
Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265,
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certification mark owners would have little to no incentive to publish the
standards governing their marks.111  Consumers sometimes base their deci-
sion to purchase a product on the presence or absence of a certification
mark,112 and competitors must have access to the certification standards if
they are to know whether they are eligible to use the mark.  An owner of a
certification mark must grant use of the certification to all products and ser-
vices that meet the standards the mark owner establishes and controls.113
The system begins to break down when the owner of the mark either
revises its standards to selectively exclude disfavored corporations or fails to
publish standards so that consumers and competitors are unable to deter-
mine if the certification mark is being issued to inferior goods (or being
withheld from sufficient or superior goods).  Besides the requirement to sub-
mit standards with the application for registration, there is no requirement
for mark owners to make the standards governing their certification marks
publicly available.  Unless the mark owner voluntarily decides to publish its
standards, they are unavailable to the public.  For example, the registration
for the certification mark “Good Housekeeping” does not list any certifica-
tion standards.114  In fact, the prosecution history is silent as to whether stan-
dards were submitted at all.  Presumably they were, because mark owners are
required to provide the USPTO with a copy of the standards to attain regis-
tration;115 however, the silence by the USPTO regarding the standards illus-
trates the magnitude of the inaccessibility problem.  Failure to require and
regulate publication of certification mark standards diminishes the competi-
tive goal of certification marks by failing to provide consumers and competi-
tors with information about the product or service’s quality characteristics.
For consumers, having access to the standards is especially important,
because the presence or absence of a certification mark could determine
whether they purchase the product at all.116  If the certification mark stan-
dards are unclear, consumers could “suffer [by being misguided into unin-
268–70 (1987). However, a certification mark, by nature, does more than merely indicate
consistent quality.  Certification marks also seek to assure the consumer that the product
they are purchasing meets specific quality standards—not just that one product is as good as
the last or that it is coming from the same source. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra
note 9, at 3; see also Midwest Plastic Fabricators, Inc. v. Underwriters Labs. Inc., 906 F.2d
1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that control over the mark is important because of the
increased risk that consumers would be misled by a certification mark representing specific
qualities of the goods that bear the mark).
111 Perhaps the only incentive being out of sheer goodwill.
112 Chesal, supra note 7.
113 In this way, certification marks tend to resemble a form of compulsory licensing.
Idaho Potato Comm’n v. G & T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 425 F.3d 708, 716 (9th Cir.
2005) (citing 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 19:91).
114 LIMITED WARRANTY TO CONSUMERS: GOOD HOUSEKEEPING SINCE 1909 REPLACEMENT
OR REFUND IF DEFECTIVE, Registration No. 3,770,704.
115 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CERTIFICATION MARK
FORM, PRINCIPAL REGISTER (2017).
116 Chesal, supra note 7.
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formed purchases] by not having an accurate sense of what a certification
represents.”117  The inaccessibility of certification standards is a problem
under both a registration-based system and especially under a common-law
system.  One could argue that the judicial system is a potential fix for either
system, because if a competitor or consumer suspects standard abuse, they
could bring a lawsuit.  However, as addressed previously, that would be a ret-
roactive remedy that would fail to prevent anticompetitive abuses before they
arise.  Furthermore, even if a party could successfully bring a suit, they would
bear the burden “to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
[the certification mark in question] is generic, or that the mark has become
generic as a result of [the mark owner’s] failure to exercise control over use
of the mark.”118  Given this burden of proof, a third-party competitor busi-
ness or consumer would face a much larger risk in bringing a lawsuit than if a
strictly registration-based system established clear publishing guidelines for
standards.  Under a common-law system without publishing requirements, a
competitor may not even be aware that the certification mark owner had lost
control of its mark under such limited access to standards.119  If clear pub-
lishing guidelines were established, the relevant competitors and consumers
would be aware of the certification standards and could more effectively allo-
cate resources towards only those claims against mark owners they believe are
truly misusing the standards.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Certification marks are inherently unfit for common-law protection and
should be enforced under a purely registration-based protection system.120
Lanham Act registration functions to provide competitors with constructive
notice of what products and corresponding standards the certification mark
designates.121  Registration also “promotes market efficiency by providing
consumers with a direct way” to locate information regarding the certifica-
tion mark.122  Additionally, registration is prima facie evidence of the validity
of the certification mark and the standards it represents.123  The benefits of
registration are even more relevant to certification marks than they are to
trademarks given that consumers tend to interpret the presence or absence
117 Fromer, supra note 23, at 165.
118 Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1887 (T.T.A.B.
2006).
119 See Fromer, supra note 23, at 165 (noting that it is extremely difficult for third-party
businesses in the marketplace to “notice something amiss with a certification standard” in
the first place).
120 As noted in Section III.A, the shortcomings noted in Section III.B and proposed
solutions in Part IV address all three types of certification marks, but due to existing
caselaw regarding indications of regional origin, for the purposes of this Note, the follow-
ing proposals address certification marks that do not indicate regional origin.
121 Kemp & Forsythe, supra note 67, at 263.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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of a certification mark on a product as a statement of truth regarding a mes-
sage of quality.124  The quality assurances that certification marks communi-
cate to consumers are not meant to be retroactively enforced and regulated
via lawsuits from third-party businesses.  A purely registration-based system of
certification marks will benefit consumers by creating more predictability in
marks, more proactive regulation of marks, and increased incentives for certi-
fiers to apply standards reliably and competitively.125
However, the problems with certification mark enforcement discussed in
Section III.B—the abuse of certification standards, the weak or nonexistent
enforcement of those standards, and the inaccessibility of information that
results in anticompetitive consequences—continue to exist even under the
current federal registration regime.  Although a common-law system would
only exacerbate these problems, the registration system has failed to do
enough to monitor certification marks and ensure they are providing con-
sumers and competitors with the utility they purport to provide.  For exam-
ple, although registrants must provide standards for the certification mark
with their application, nothing describes a particular level of detail required
for those standards.  Once registered, mark owners are not subjected to
audits regarding control over their certification mark standards.  Moreover,
the existing certifiers generally have developed entrance barriers by virtue of
their certification standard abuse that are sufficient to deter and prohibit any
emergent competition in the marketplace.126  In order to counter these defi-
ciencies in the certification system, measures must be implemented “to
increase the checks and balances within [the certification mark] system.”127
The proposed solution to the inadequacies of the current registration system
involves a procedural overhaul including increased specificity requirements
of certification standards, public disclosure of certification standards upon
filing and for each subsequent revision, periodic audits, and required record
keeping of all decisions to either grant or deny use of the mark to third
parties.
A. Increased Regulation of Certification Mark Standards
Although increasing regulation of certifiers may seem like an obvious
solution, what is not obvious is the form that increased regulation should
take.  Jeanne Fromer notes two possible solutions: (1) a substantive approach
where the government would define the certification mark standards, and
(2) a procedural approach where regulations would provide oversight that is
124 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 19:91 (“One who sees . . . a certification mark on a
product or in connection with a service is entitled to assume that that product or service in
fact meets whatever standards of safety or quality have been set up and advertised by the
certifier.”).
125 Chesal, supra note 7 (observing that federally registered certification marks have the
ability to rely on statutory damages under the Federal Trademark Act’s counterfeiting
provisions).
126 Fromer, supra note 23, at 165.
127 Chon, supra note 106, at 2329.
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lacking over private certifiers’ processes of crafting, disclosing, revising, and
applying certification standards.128  These two proposed solutions beg the
question of whether the entire problem is procedural.  Fromer argues that
the substantive approach is not a realistic solution to the shortcomings of the
certification mark system because it undermines the objectives of fostering a
competitive market by having the government, rather than the business,
define the standards.129  Although one current problem is the ability of certi-
fiers to revise standards to refuse certification to certain companies, a certain
level of flexibility in revising standards is desirable in order to adapt to mar-
ket changes and consumer preferences.130  However, companies are closer to
the marketplace and consumers than the government, so the substantive
approach would result in inflexible standards that would become obsolete, as
they were incapable of adapting to changes.
Fromer proposes that the more realistic solution to the shortfalls of cer-
tification marks is a combination of procedural changes such as increased
regulations and oversight of publication of certification standards, notice and
comment forums for revisions of standards, and audits of certification deci-
sions by the government.131  This proposed combination would help
decrease standard abuse, enforcement problems, and increase accessibility of
certification standards—the three main problems that plague certification
mark protection.  While an increase in procedural regulation will help curb
many of the existing abuses, eventually the certification mark system may
need to be reevaluated to determine what level of substantive involvement
the government ought to have.  In certain situations, procedure has proven
inadequate to solve certain dilemmas.  For example, where several mark own-
ers use similar terms but do not use them for consistent meanings, a substan-
tive government intervention may be necessary to clarify the meaning of the
terms.132
Increased oversight of certification standards would involve the USPTO,
which would determine whether the proposed standard was sufficiently spe-
cific and comprehensive.  Ideally, the legislature would clarify what level of
specificity is required of applicants when submitting standards, because cur-
rent law merely requires the applicant to submit “[a] copy of the certification
standards.”133  Historically, extremely vague standards have been deemed
sufficient to get initial registration.134  For example, a PG-13 movie certifica-
tion merely provided that a movie with a PG-13 rating would be one that “in
128 Fromer, supra note 23, at 173.
129 Id. at 178.
130 Id. at 177.
131 Id. at 182–89.
132 Id. at 175.  It is not always the case that the mark owner is more in touch with
consumers than the government.  For example, in 1990 the government had to intervene
and pass the Organic Foods Production Act to address inconsistent certification standards
for organic foods. Id.
133 37 C.F.R. § 2.45(a)(4)(i)(B) (2012).
134 Fromer, supra note 23, at 183 (providing the MPAA’s PG-13 certification as an
example of a very vague certification standard that was granted registration).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL110.txt unknown Seq: 19  9-NOV-17 14:04
2017] (un)common  law  protection 437
the opinion of the [MPAA], contains . . . nudity, language, sensuality, treat-
ment of theme, and violence such that parents should exercise caution
before allowing their children under thirteen years of age to attend.”135
That certification standard depended on both the opinion of the MPAA and
the parents of such children and did not specify the threshold limits of
nudity, language, etc., that would trigger the standard.  Nevertheless, under
the current federal registration requirements, this standard was sufficient.
This level of vagueness in certification standards sets the foundation for
future anticompetitive abuses by the mark owner.  Short of substantive inter-
vention, applying for registration ought to require more from the applicant
than a mere recital of vague standards based solely on opinion.  Standards
should contain some level of concrete standards by which competitors can
ascertain whether their goods or services qualify and, in the case of an
alleged lack of control, the judicial body examining the standards can judge
whether there has been improper use of the mark.
Requiring increased specificity in terms of the certification standards dis-
closed upon filing for registration would be pointless without subsequent
review of those tests to ensure they are being implemented fairly.136  USPTO
examiners are not experts on the certification standards (both because they
are not the closest to the marketplace and because it would be logistically
impossible for them to be experts on standards of all marks), so the USPTO
could publicly disclose the proposed certification standards to the relevant
public (consumers of the product and interested third-party businesses) to
solicit their opinions as to whether the disclosed standard is sufficiently spe-
cific and comprehensive.137  Other areas of IP law, such as patent law,
employ the input of outside experts to evaluate whether the application is
sufficient.
Alternatively, the certification mark owner could be required to disclose
its certification standards in a forum accessible to interested parties.
Although consumers are considered a relevant party, having access to the
certification standards is probably more important to competitors in the mar-
ketplace who are interested in using the mark on their own goods or services.
Therefore, simply publishing certification standards on the mark owner’s
website would provide access to interested parties.  The mark owner should
be required to post its original certification standards and post updated stan-
dards each time it revises its standards.  Although this will certainly place
135 Id. (first alteration in original).
136 Id. at 185.
137 Id. However, others may argue that although the USPTO is a gatekeeper, it “is not
responsible for policing how registered trademarks are used.” Heh, supra note 13, at 713
(“Trademark law developed to prevent use of trademarks in an inappropriate manner, not
to provide causes of action to misled consumers or indirect competitors in unfair competi-
tion claims.”).  Another proposed solution was to utilize the FTC to police misuse of certifi-
cation marks.  Emily Nation, Comment, Geographical Indications: The International Debate over
Intellectual Property Rights for Local Producers, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 959, 1006 (2011) (arguing
that GI protection in the United States could benefit from an FTC that aggressively fought
deceptive geographic advertising).
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additional burdens on the mark owner (especially if the nature of the certi-
fied good or service is one that requires frequent revisions to the standards),
the burdens are not undue, because if the mark owner is spending the time
and effort on revising the standards, it is reasonable to require them to pub-
lish their work product.
A few minor revisions have already been made regarding when mark
owners must disclose their certification standards, but much more must be
done for the statutes to have any teeth.  Nevertheless, the very fact that these
revisions were made indicates that increasing procedural requirements is a
step toward resolving some of the certification mark abuses.  For example,
originally, certification standards were only required to be disclosed with the
application for registration, but no level of specificity was required.  Now,
certification mark owners must periodically file with the USPTO that they
continue to use the certification mark (or have not used it for an excusable
reason).138  Additionally, the mark owner must now disclose whether its certi-
fication standards have changed and, if so, provide the USPTO with the new
standards.139
These revisions are a step in the right direction of carrying out the
intended goals of the certification mark system and it further highlights why
common law protection of certification marks is not a desirable, or even feasi-
ble, option.  It is the incentive to maintain registration that prompts the certi-
fication mark owner to file periodic revisions with the USPTO.  Without the
incentive of maintaining registration, certification mark owners could revise
standards without disclosing those revisions until they were brought to court
by an affected party (if they were caught and assuming the affected party had
the resources to commence a lawsuit).  Incentives of maintaining registration
include presumption of validity in the case of an infringement lawsuit as well
as the option of receiving statutory damages.140  Owners of federally regis-
tered certification marks may be entitled to statutory damages under the Lan-
ham Act’s counterfeiting provisions in Section 1117(c).141  However, the
recent revisions fail to do enough, particularly because the requirement to
periodically file with the USPTO regarding continued use of a certification
mark only occurs between the fifth and sixth years of registration, again
between the ninth and tenth years, and between every ninth and tenth year
going forward.142  Under those requirements, a certification mark owner still
138 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1059 (2012); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.161, 7.37 (2012) (between the fifth
and sixth years, ninth and tenth years, and between every ninth and tenth year of registra-
tion going forward).
139 Fromer, supra note 23 at 160 (citing Changes in Requirements for Collective Trade-
marks and Service Marks, Collective Membership Marks, and Certification Marks, 80 Fed.
Reg. 33,170, 33,182–83 (June 11, 2015) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 2 and 7) (changes in 37
C.F.R. §§ 2.161, 7.37)).
140 Chesal, supra note 7 (federally registered certification marks have the ability to rely
on statutory damages under the Federal Trademark Act’s counterfeiting provisions).
141 Id. (citing Idaho Potato Comm’n v. G & T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 425 F.3d 708
(9th Cir. 2005)).
142 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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has a minimum five years, and at the most ten, during which it may alter its
certification standards and not be required to publish them, thus providing a
window of opportunity for anticompetitive abuses.
Even more disclosure of certification standards is necessary in order to
truly realize the objectives of certification marks in preventing consumer con-
fusion and promoting healthy competition in the marketplace.  Generally,
increased disclosure of certification standards would allow both businesses
and consumers to monitor whether a “[mark owner’s] certification practice
diverges from the articulated test.”143  If the certification mark realm is truly
about trust between the mark owner, consumers, and other third-party busi-
nesses that the products bearing the mark embody the quality standards,
then mark owners should willingly subject certification tests to regular, public
audits as a demonstration of their good faith effort to administer the test
fairly and solely based on the presence or absence of the standards.  In fol-
lowing the trend of recent revisions, the USPTO would be the ideal entity at
this point to carry out these periodic audits.
In addition to increasing the specificity required of certification stan-
dards and requiring the standards to be published, Fromer suggests that
mark owners be required to disclose all decisions regarding granting or deny-
ing use of its certification marks.144  This would enable competitors in the
marketplace seeking certification to learn why decisions were made and
whether the decisions are consistent with the published certification test.
Requiring publication of the “precedent” would not only encourage mark
owners to control use of its certification mark more consistently in the first
place, but would also provide courts with a detailed record of past decisions.
This detailed record would help courts determine whether the mark owner
had been using the mark improperly.
However, even this approach has shortcomings.  First, there is the issue
of to whom mark owners should be required to report their decisions.  In
order to have any reliable precedential value, decisions ought to be reported
to a third party.  If mark owners were permitted to privately record their deci-
sions, abuses could arise in the form of selective record-keeping and revision-
ism.  The USPTO is the most obvious entity to whom mark owners could be
required to report decisions.145  Second, there is an issue of what level of
specificity is required in record-keeping of decisions to grant of deny use of
the mark.  For example, in its own form of record-keeping of movie ratings
decisions, the MPAA was sometimes very specific (“Rated PG for brief mild
143 Fromer, supra note 23, at 182.
144 Id. at 190.
145 The USPTO is the most obvious entity because the USPTO is responsible for initial
review of certification standards, and the USPTO has been deemed the ideal entity to lead
all the proposed regulation increases.  However, an additional problem, beyond the scope
of this Note, is whether the USPTO has the resources or time to be able to handle all of
these additional certification mark requirements.  Successful and efficient implementation
of these proposed solutions may require establishing a new entity entirely devoted to certi-
fication marks.
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language and an adolescent punch in the nose”) and sometimes still vague
(“Rated PG for quirky situations, action and mild language”).146  Additional
regulations would have to be passed in order to flesh out these issues before
such precedential record keeping would be a viable solution.
B. Continued Shortcomings
For any of these proposed solutions to sufficiently address standard
abuse, the enforcement problem, and the inaccessibility of certification stan-
dards, there can be no common-law protection for certification marks.  If
there were common-law rights for certification marks, there would be no
incentive to register a mark.  In fact, there would be incentives not to register
a mark because it would avoid the proposed requirements of publishing stan-
dards, notifying the USPTO and relevant public when the standards were
revised, and recording decisions.147
Even if all these proposed solutions were implemented, there will still be
certification mark owners who manage to abuse the system and wield certifi-
cation marks in an anticompetitive manner.  Additionally, there is a risk of
going too far with the level of detail required of certification standards that
must be avoided.148  Because a certain level of flexibility is required in certifi-
cation standards for them to function properly and remain relevant, there
will always be some degree of abuses that occur.  In those instances, resorting
to the judicial system for resolution may be the natural and obvious
choice.149  However, by limiting use of certification marks to the registration
system in the first place, anticompetitive abuses would be much diminished
and courts’ burdens lightened, because many of the abuses that plague certi-
fication mark use (standard abuse, lack of control, and inaccessibility of certi-
fication standards) would be resolved at the procedural level as opposed to
allowing protection of certification marks under common law as well.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that “[a] certification mark is a special creature created for a
purpose uniquely different from that of an ordinary service mark or trade-
mark.”150  It is clear that certification marks differ from trademarks in that
they indicate collective origin as opposed to unique commercial origin, and
146 Fromer, supra note 23, at 192 (quoting Jason Bailey, The Funniest MPAA Ratings
Descriptions of All Time, FLAVORWIRE (Jan. 9, 2015), http://flavorwire.com/498012/the-fun-
niest-mpaa-ratings-descriptions-of-all-time (quoting these descriptors)).
147 Cf. Jonathan M. Barnett, Intermediaries Revisited: Is Efficient Certification Consistent with
Profit Maximization?, 37 J. CORP. L. 475, 480 (2012) (“Any intervention into a certification
market must balance the risk of future regulatory failure against current market failures.”).
148 Chon, supra note 106, at 2332 (“Consumers may face a confusing proliferation of
certifications, labels, and marks.”).
149 In some instances, substantive government intervention may be necessary to clarify
the meaning of certain standards, but procedural solutions ought to be employed before
encouraging any type of substantive solution.
150 In re Fla. Citrus Comm’n, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 495, 499 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
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that, unlike an owner of a trademark, an owner of a certification mark is not
permitted to use the mark on his own goods or services.  However, it is not
clear, based on existing scholarship, whether certification marks have com-
mon-law protection like trademarks.  Besides a few arguably unpersuasive
cases pertaining specifically to indications of regional origin, no authority has
held that certification marks as a whole enjoy such protection outside federal
registration.
Existing problems with certification mark enforcement under the fed-
eral registration system include anticompetitive standard abuse, little to no
enforcement of certification standards, and inaccessibility of certification
standards and revisions.  These three problems would be exacerbated under
a common-law regime.  When the Lanham Act was codified in 1946, it essen-
tially codified existing common law for trademarks, but no such common law
existed for certification marks.  Thus, common law is an ill-suited form of
protection for certification marks.
The current federal registration system should address existing short-
comings of certification mark protection by specifying a certain level of detail
to be included in certification standards, requiring publication of those stan-
dards, and requiring mark owners to record and report all decisions to either
grant or deny use of their marks.  These procedural improvements will signif-
icantly decrease the number of abuses that occur with certification marks,
but they will not prevent all abuses.  Some unique situations may require the
government to substantively intervene in order to ensure that certification
marks continue to be used in a procompetitive manner.
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